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Becoming aware of one’s own mistake
may be a prerequisite for remedial and
compensatory actions. Improving error
awareness is of great interest for situa-
tions of human life in which either a high
accuracy is emphasized or in which peo-
ple have to communicate errors among
each other in order to improve group
performance. Having a closer under-
standing of what makes a person aware
of an error and which brain corre-
lates are involved in this process might
open new perspectives for enhancing error
awareness in multiple fields of everyday
life.
Research on error awareness has to
deal with two fundamental issues: how to
manipulate and how to measure conscious
error perception.
What all error awareness studies have
in common is that subjects are required
to signal the commission of an error.
Only with this subjective evaluation has
it been possible to categorize errors into
“aware” and “unaware.” Two different pro-
cedures have been used for this: either
participants only press a dedicated “error
signaling button,” when they feel that
their last response has been wrong, or
subjects are required to evaluate their
response after each trial. Both procedures
have disadvantages (Klein et al., 2013).
Therefore, it would be advantageous,
if subjective error awareness could be
deduced from the subject’s brain activ-
ity without asking participants directly. A
recent study by Murphy and colleagues
(2012) provides deeper insights for these
considerations.
Two event-related potentials cor-
relate with different aspects of error
processing: the error-related negativity
(ERN; Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring
et al., 1993) and the error positivity (Pe,
Falkenstein et al., 1990). The functional
role of the ERN has been the subject of
several elaborate theories (Falkenstein
et al., 1991; Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd
and Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 2004). In
contrast, the generation and the func-
tional significance of the Pe seem less
clear (Overbeek et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2009). Theories of the role of the
Pe range from being a representation of
the motivational valence of the erroneous
response (Leuthold and Sommer, 1999) to
being a correlate of evidence accumulation
of error occurrence [i.e., subject’s error
awareness (Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010;
Ullsperger et al., 2010)].
Earlier electrophysiological research
concluded that a measurable Pe is only
detectable after a consciously perceived
error (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass
et al., 2005, 2007; for a discussion of
the role of the ERN in error awareness:
Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Wessel et al.,
2011; Wessel, 2012). However, previ-
ous electrophysiological research (e.g.,
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al.,
2005, 2007; see also Klein et al., 2007)
on error awareness has always been per-
formed with group-averaged data, and
analyses were time-locked to the erro-
neous response thereby neglecting that
processes related to the erroneous button
press (and most likely related to the
ERN) might be dissociable from processes
underlying error-awareness and the Pe
(Hughes and Yeung, 2011). Indeed, there
could be a significant temporal jitter
between the erroneous response and the
onset of error awareness processes, which
could be especially problematic in group
studies comparing patients with healthy
controls. If the timing between error com-
mission and the onset of the Pe differs
between groups, researchers might find
spurious differences in Pe amplitudes
between groups when they analyze the
Pe time-locked to the erroneous but-
ton press. The study by Murphy et al.
(2012) elegantly addressed these issues
and thereby the functional significance of
the Pe. The study provides the basis for
more substantiated conclusions on the
functionality of the Pe. By using an EEG
variant of the Go/NoGo error awareness
task (cf. Hester et al., 2005; O’Connell
et al., 2007) they investigated the pro-
cess of becoming aware of an error and
its correlation to different aspects of the
Pe. Participants indicated error awareness
with a speeded button press thereby sup-
plying the researchers with precise timing
information about the awareness process.
To get a pure single trial measure of the Pe
and to have access to the within trial vari-
ability in amplitude and latency they used
independent-component analysis (ICA,
Makeig et al., 2004) in order to isolate a
Pe-component that is free of any potential
contaminations (muscle artifacts, stim-
ulus processing etc.). They used these
individually determined components to
correlate them (within- and between-
subject) with behavioral indices of error
awareness: the reaction time and the fre-
quency of the error signaling response.
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In contrast to earlier studies, where Pe
analyses were time-locked to the erro-
neous response, Murphy and colleagues
showed that the Pe amplitude and latency
is more strongly related to the awareness
button press than to the preceding erro-
neous response. Precise Pe analyses should
therefore take the timing of the subjective
awareness signaling into account to avoid
the amplitude being affected by a signaling
latency jitter. Using receiver-operating-
characteristic (ROC) analysis the authors
showed that the Pe could be used to pre-
dict an awareness response well before
this response was issued. Murphy and
colleagues furthermore demonstrated that
Pe amplitude and latency are predictive for
the proportion of awareness responses on
the between subject level. The authors
finally conclude that the Pe correlates
with the cumulative development of error
awareness.
The present paper is remarkable due
to both its methodological improvements
and the advancements in understanding
the process of becoming aware of an error
as well as the functional role of the Pe in
this process. As discussed by the authors,
direct improvements for future studies can
be derived: the use of a speeded error-
signaling response (see also Ullsperger
and Von Cramon, 2006) seems useful to
measure the precise timing of develop-
ment of awareness on the individual level.
Implications for clinical studies investigat-
ing patients with deficits in error aware-
ness might be that observed differences
in Pe amplitude might also be an “arti-
fact” due to timing differences in the
process of becoming aware of an error
(and thereby latency differences in Pe).
The authors therefore suggest investigating
error awareness with respect to the error
signaling response and not with respect
to the erroneous response as such. The
cumulative nature of the awareness pro-
cess that the authors suggest fits well with
the central role that is often assumed for
the anterior insula in error awareness (see
Klein et al., 2013 for a recent review).
Might it become possible to directly
infer error awareness from the individual
response of the subject’s brain (i.e., the Pe)
without an explicit awareness response?
Murphy and colleagues showed on the
one hand that ROC analyses on post-
response brain data are indeed able to
predict error awareness with high accu-
racy. On the other hand, they pointed
out that error signaling responses are
needed for more accurate Pe analyses.
Especially for clinical studies comparing
different groups of patients with healthy
controls, a speeded subjective response
evaluation could clearly improve research
on error awareness processes. A better
understanding of awareness processes and
their neurophysiological correlates might
also stimulate research on interventions
that might help to promote error aware-
ness and on factors that reduce error
awareness (e.g., neurological diseases, psy-
chiatric illness, drugs, tiredness, etc.).
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